Nevertheless, it can More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition — which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification — but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs.
Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position. Imagination in Philosophy of Mind.
Justification in Epistemology. In short, perceptual processes can randomly fail, and perceptual knowledge is stochastically fallible. The narrow implication here is that any epistemological account that entails stochastic infallibilism, like safety, is simply untenable. More broadly, this myth of stochastic infallibilism provides a valuable illustration of the importance of integrating empirical findings into epistemological thinking. Infallibility in Epistemology. Perceptual Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind. Safety and Sensitivity in Epistemology. In their widely cited article, Swain et al.
What they found is a typical example of priming, where presenting one stimulus before presenting another stimulus affects the way the latter is perceived or evaluated. In their experiment, laypersons were less likely to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp case when they first read a scenario describing a clear case of knowledge, and more We tried to replicate Swain et al.
We found no priming effect for knowledge ratings regarding the Truetemp case — laypersons were similarly likely to attribute knowledge in all three investigated conditions. These three failed replication attempts are not decisive as to whether the priming effect in question occurs, nevertheless, the collected data puts Swain et al. It is argued that the criteria for evaluating mechanistic evidence can be used in Inference to the Best Explanation and such use thereby increases the resilience of probabilities in a Bayesian framework.
This point grows out of the emerging literature on evidence-based medicine and naturally strengthens McCain and Poston's proposal that explanatory Assertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion.
In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e. Williamson , in Instead, the justified belief account championed by, e. Douven , seems to prevail. The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P.
Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that meeting this Epistemic Norms in Epistemology.
Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology. Evidentialism in Epistemology. Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose.
I present two First, even if justification itself amounts to no more than epistemic permissibility, the lottery paradox recurs at the level of doxastic obligations unless one adopts an extremely permissive view about suspension of belief that is in tension with our practice of doxastic criticism. Second, even if there are no obligations to believe lottery propositions, the permissibility solution fails because epistemic permissions typically agglomerate, and the lottery case provides no exception to this rule. Epistemic Paradoxes, Misc in Epistemology.
Justification, Misc in Epistemology.
Social epistemology - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action. This is a republication of 'Hegeby Zanin' in a second country for the use on international philosophy students and researchers in non English language, combines two epistemology books ; classic epistemology and social epistemology. The paper has two main parts.
In particular, additional theoretical resources are needed to explain i the way in which epistemic aims are genuinely good aims, and ii the way in which some forms of reasoning can be epistemically better than others even when they are equally conducive to attaining the Epistemic Value in Epistemology. Epistemic Virtues in Epistemology.
The Concept of Knowledge in Epistemology.
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Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology. Cultural Studies in Social Sciences. History of Physics in Philosophy of Physical Science. ABSTRACTThe idea of the Anthropocene postulates that, epistemically and ontologically, we must consider the climatic, geological, and biological systems of the Earth as essentially bound up with th ABSTRACTCritical accounts over the past years have focused on neoliberalism as a subject of knowledge; there has been a recently growing interest in neoliberalism as an object of knowledge. This ar ABSTRACTThe social democratic state pursued interventionism for positive political freedom, making markets adapt to the needs of a fair democratic society, with the provision of social rights.
A new Teaching Excellent Framework emerged in with results determined pr ABSTRACTWorldwide emergence of strongmen leaderships and eroded or failed democracies suggest that the era of unchallenged neoliberal hegemony may be winding down and that alternatives are rising Its academics and students are shorn of autonomy beyond the sale of their labour-power.
One h However, they are facing challenges from new providers facilita These we This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy. These include, for him, facts upon which there is a scientif I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three Disjunctivism in Philosophy of Mind. Epistemic Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Epistemological Theories, Misc in Epistemology. Perceptual Justification in Philosophy of Mind.
The A Priori in Epistemology. After indicating the limitations of current proposals rega The actual and potential uses of holograms in museum displays, and the philosophy of knowledge and progress that they represent. Magazine journalists, museum curators, and historians sometimes face similar challenges in making topics or technologies relevant to wider audiences.
To varying degrees, they must justify the significance of their subjects of study by identifying a newsworthy slant, a pedagogical role, or an analytical purpose. In science and technology studies, the problem It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.
Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Cite Citation. Permissions Icon Permissions. Issue Section:. You do not currently have access to this article. Download all figures. However, they were generally part of an epistemological enterprise that was basically egocentric in orientation, so they are perhaps not ideal or pure paradigms of social epistemology. Nonetheless, they are clear examples of early epistemologies that examined social dimensions of epistemic justification.
A different tradition focused on aspects of knowledge that are "social" in a more sociological or political sense, though members of this tradition less frequently aligned their work to core issues in epistemology. Karl Marx's theory of ideology could well be considered a type of social epistemology. On one interpretation of Marx's conception of "ideology", an ideology is a set of beliefs, a world-view, or a form of consciousness that is in some fashion false or delusive. The cause of these beliefs, and perhaps of their delusiveness, is the social situation and interests of the believers.
Since the theory of ideology, so described, is concerned with the truth and falsity of beliefs, it might even be considered a form of classical social epistemology. Karl Mannheim extended Marx's theory of ideology into a sociology of knowledge. He classed forms of consciousness as ideological when the thoughts of a social group can be traced to the group's social situation or "life conditions" The descriptive enterprise of tracing these thoughts to the social situation might be construed as social epistemology.
The further enterprise of critiquing and dissolving ideological delusions — "Ideologiekritik" — is surely a form of social epistemology.
A guide to ontology, epistemology, and philosophical perspectives for interdisciplinary researchers
The critical theory of the Frankfurt School was one attempt, or a family of attempts, to develop this idea. Critical theory aims at emancipation and enlightenment by making agents aware of hidden coercion in their environment, enabling them to determine where their true interests lie Geuss In a variant of critical theory, Jurgen Habermas introduced the idea of an "ideal speech situation", a hypothetical situation of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents Habermas ; Geuss In some writings Habermas uses the ideal speech situation as a transcendental criterion of truth.
Beliefs that agents would agree upon in the ideal speech situation are ipso facto true beliefs Habermas and Luhmann , Here a social communicational device is treated as a type of epistemic standard. Subsequent developments in the sociology of knowledge, and especially in the sociology of science, can also be considered forms of social epistemology. Since science is widely considered the paradigmatic knowledge-producing enterprise, and since epistemology is centrally concerned with knowledge, any endeavor that seeks to identify social determinants of science might plausibly be categorized as a form of social epistemology.
Both Mannheim and the sociologist of science Robert Merton exempted natural science from the influence of societal or "existential" factors of the types that influence other categories of beliefs. Science was viewed as a society unto itself, largely autonomous from the rest of society. But later sociologists of science have declined to offer the same exemption. The Edinburgh School contends that all scientific beliefs are on a par with other beliefs in terms of their causes. Barry Barnes and David Bloor formulated a "symmetry" or "equivalence" postulate, according to which all beliefs are on a par with respect to the causes of their credibility Many historical case studies conducted in this tradition have tried to show how scientists too are swayed by class interests, political interests, and other factors usually considered "external" to pure science Forman ; Shapin ; Mackenzie Kuhn's descriptions of the practices of scientific research communities, especially descriptions of the inculcation and preservation of paradigms during periods of "normal" science, were clear and influential examples of a social analysis of science, especially when contrasted with the positivist tradition of analysis.
Michel Foucault developed a radically political view of knowledge and science, arguing that practices of so-called knowledge-seeking, especially in the modern world, really serve the aims of power and social domination , All of these writers may be considered "social epistemologists", although they themselves do not employ this phrase.
Perhaps the first use of the phrase "social epistemology" appears in the writings of a library scientist, Jesse Shera, who in turn credits his associate Margaret Egan. The focus of this discipline should be upon the production, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought throughout the entire social fabric" Shera was particularly interested in the affinity between social epistemology and librarianship. He did not, however, construct a conception of social epistemology with very definite philosophical or social-scientific contours.
What might such contours be?